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INTRODUCTION TO LETTERS OF CREDIT

In both international and domestic sales transactions, the contract of sale determines the obligations of the buyer and the
seller. In international sales transactions, a contract for the sale of
goods is usually executed in conjunction with a banker's documentary credit to secure the prompt payment of the contract
price." Documentary credits are not typically used in domestic
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. Barrister
1972, Middle Temple, London; LL.M. 1971, London University, King's College;

M.B.L. 1971, City of London Polytechnic, London; Grad. Cert. Ed. 1971, Garnett College, London; B.B.L. 1970, City of London Polytechnic, London. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance by John Eric Anderson,
Mark MacDonald, William Paul Morelli and Richard Knoth in the preparation
of this paper.
1. See C. SCHmiTTHOFF, SCHMITTHOFF'S EXPORT TRADE 244-69 (7th ed. 1980);
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sales transactions because the contractual risks are significantly
reduced where both the parties to the contract and the performance of the contractual obligations will take place in one country.
In addition, domestic trade in the United States involves fewer
commercial uncertainties than does international trade due to
such factors as nationwide postal and telecommunication services,
the Uniform Commercial Code,2 and a uniform judicial system.
International sales transactions, on the other hand, often involve
the cost and inconvenience of currency exchange restrictions and
the risk of multiple lawsuits in disparate legal systems. For example, in a routine domestic sales transaction the seller simply tenders goods and the buyer pays for them. In a typical international
sales transaction, a United States seller would probably balk at
shipping goods to a foreign buyer before receiving payment for
the goods, and the foreign buyer would likewise be reluctant to
tender payment before inspecting the goods3 to ensure that they
conform to the contract.
Letters of credit 4 are used to reduce these problems and risks
by introducing predictability and security into international sales
transactions. 5 For centuries merchants have utilized letters of
credit to facilitate trade among nations." In a typical international
documentary credit arrangement, a buyer instructs a domestic
bank, the issuing bank,7 to open a documentary credit for a forsee

also H.

FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT ch.

1 (1930); B. KOZOLCHYK, LETTERS OF CREDIT, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as B. KOZOLCHYK, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA]; B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE

AMERICAS § 1.01[3] at 9 (1966) [hereinafter cited as B. KOZOLCHYK].
2. All cites to the UCC are to the 1978 version.
3. See UCC § 2-513(1) (1978); see also C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra note 1, at 9295; A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 214-23 (1982).

4. A letter of credit is a written instrument addressed by one person to another that requests the latter to give credit to the person in whose favor it is

drawn. A letter of credit is a negotiable instrument whereby a person requests
another to advance money or give credit to a third person with a promise to
repay the person making the advancement. An export letter of credit is issued
by a foreign bank to a local seller that enables the seller to draw a draft on the
foreign bank against shipment of the merchandise. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
813, 814 (5th ed. 1979). See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, § 23.04[2] at 599.
5. See generally Davis, Commercial Letters of Credit, 5 SYDNEY L. REv. 14
(1965) ("commercial letters of credit ... [are] the crankshaft of modern commerce") (citing CHORLEY, LAW OF BANKING 179 (4th ed. 1960)).
6. See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, § 1.01.

7. This Article uses the terms "issuing bank" and "confirming bank" inter-
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eign seller. The issuing bank then instructs a bank designated by
the foreign seller, the correspondent bank, to accept, negotiate, or
pay the amount specified on the buyer's draft to the seller upon
presentation of certain shipping and sales documents by the
seller. The correspondent bank advises the seller of the specific
documents that the seller must deliver before the correspondent
bank will accept and pay the amount of buyer's draft. Finally,
arrangements are made through customary banking channels for
the transfer of payment between the issuing bank and the correspondent bank.8
The documents tendered by the seller to the correspondent
bank typically must conform to the requirements contained in the
letter of credit. When the seller tenders conforming documents,
the correspondent bank is obligated to pay the seller the purchase
price specified in the letter of credit. The correspondent bank's
obligation to pay the seller upon presentation of the specified
documents is not, however, conditioned on the buyer's prior receipt of the goods. The quintessence of all letter of credit arrangements is the fact that they are documentary sales.' The sole concern of the correspondent bank is that the documents tendered
by the seller conform to the letter of credit specifications. Using
letters of credit in international sales transactions serves the primary interests of both buyers and sellers. The seller's delivery of
conforming documents to the correspondent bank simultaneously
provides the foreign seller with prompt payment for the shipment
of goods and the domestic buyer with symbolic delivery of conforming goods. 10
Four basic contractual relationships exist in an international
letter of credit transaction."' First, the underlying sales contract
changeably when referring to the substantive rights of the seller under a letter of
credit.
8. See B. KOZOLCHYK, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 7-8; C.
SCHMITrHOFF,

supra note 1, at 247.

9. See UCC § 5-103(1)(b); see also INTERNATIONAL

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

art. 8(a) (1974)
[hereinafter referred to as UCP].
10. See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, § 5.02[1] at 147; C. SCHMITTHOFF, supra
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR

DocuMENTARY

CREDITS,

note 1, at 364.
11. United City Merchants Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada [1982] 2 W.L.R.
1039, 1044-45 (H.L.). Lord Diplock stated that "[it is trite law that there are
four autonomous though interconnected contractual relationships involved." Id.

at 1044.
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creates rights and duties between the buyer and seller. 12 The addition of a letter of credit contract to the transaction does not
alter these contractual rights and duties.' 3
Second, the letter of credit creates contractual duties and obligations for the buyer to deposit in the issuing bank the money
necessary to finance the underlying sales contract.1 4 If the buyer
maintains an account with the issuing bank and the funds on deposit in the buyer's account equal or exceed the purchase price of
the goods, the issuing bank may extend a letter of credit to the
seller for the amount agreed upon in the letter of credit.'5 The
deposit of money into an existing account for the exclusive purpose of purchasing a letter of credit contractually prohibits the
issuing bank from using that money for any purpose other than
the letter of credit. This contractual prohibition prevents the issuing bank from using money deposited for letter of credit purposes to satisfy any indebtedness the buyer might incur during
the period of time that the letter of credit is in effect.' 6 The
bank's use of letter of credit funds to satisfy debts of the buyer
would make the bank liable to both the seller for whom the credit
was extended and to the buyer for breach of the contract of deposit. 17 A buyer may also, however, purchase letters of credit from

the issuing bank for cash. In transactions where letters of credit
12. This contractual relationship is based on "the underlying contract for the
sale of goods, to which the only parties are the buyer and the seller." Id.
13. See 6 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 12, § 30 (perm. ed. 1975).
14. This second contractual relationship is described as follows:
[T]he contract between the buyer and the issuing bank under which the
latter agrees to issue the credit and either itself or through a confirming
bank to notify the credit to the seller and to make payments to or to the
order of the seller (or to pay, accept or negotiate bills of exchange drawn
by the seller) against presentation of stipulated documents; and the buyer
agrees to reimburse the issuing bank for payments made under the credit.
For such reimbursement the stipulated documents, if they include a document of title such as a bill of lading, constitute a security available to the
issuing bank.
U.C.M., [1982] 2 W.L.R. at 1044. See Schmitthoff, Confirmation in Export
Transactions, 1957 J. Bus. L. 17.
15. See H. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, at 168.
16. Id. at 168-69, n.61.
17. The bank's right to reimbursement may be established in terms of the
letter of credit. While the right to reimbursement allows a bank to apply letter
of credit funds to the debts of its customer, it does not relieve the bank from its
obligations to pay the seller upon the presentation of conforming documents. Id.
at 169, n.61.
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are purchased for cash, money paid to the bank is not actually on
deposit because, arguably, the purchaser has exchanged title to
the money in return for the bank's obligations under the letter of
credit. Another method of purchasing letters of credit, which
avoids the requirement of depositing money with the bank, is to
contract with the bank to issue the letter of credit either "against
the promise of the buyer to indemnify the bank" ' or as an extension of credit. This type of purchase arrangement often allows a
buyer to defer repaying the bank until after the financed goods
have been resold at the retail price.19
Third, a contractual relationship that may be revocable or irrevocable exists between the issuing bank and the seller. An irrevocable letter of credit contract gives the seller a cause of action
against the issuing bank if the letter of credit is dishonored. 0
Correspondent banks that are merely advisory banks, however,
are not liable to the seller for letters of credit that have been dishonored. A correspondent bank acting in an advisory capacity
agrees only to serve as the fully-disclosed agent of the issuing
bank and does not assume any personal liability. If the draft
presented by the seller is dishonored by a correspondent bank
acting in an advisory capacity, the seller should proceed directly
against the issuing bank and against the buyer when appropriate.
At the time the seller presents the specified documents to the
correspondent bank, the seller's goods usually are already in
transit.21 The seller, therefore, is placed in a somewhat precarious

18. Id. at 170.
19. Annot., 35 A.L.R. 3d 1404, 1406 (1971).
20. See H..FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150.
21. In international sales transactions the parties generally will be operating
under a C.I.F. contract. "The term C.I.F. means that the [contract] price includes in a lump sum the cost of the goods and the insurance and freight to the
named destination." UCC § 2-320(1). See also UCC § 2-320(2)(a)-(e), which
states in pertinent part:
[A C.I.F. contract] requires the seller at his own expense and risk to
(a) put the goods into the possession of a

carrier . . . and obtain a

negotiable bill or bills of lading ...and
(b) obtain a receipt ...showing that the freight has been paid... and
(c) obtain a policy ... of insurance invoice ... and
(d) prepare an invoice of the goods ... and

(e) forward and tender all the documents[to the buyer].
Section 2-320 provides the standard requirements of C.I.F. contracts. The sec-

tion is not always applicable in international trade; usually the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) INCOTERMS (INCOTERMS 1980 replaced the
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position because the goods have either already been delivered to
the carrier or possession transferred to an agent, but the seller
has not yet delivered the specified documents to nor received
payment from the correspondent bank. If the correspondent bank
is acting solely as the fully-disclosed agent of the issuing bank
and refuses to pay on the draft upon presentation of conforming
documents by the seller, the issuing bank has breached the terms
of the letter of credit contract.22
Fourth, a contractual relationship often exists between the
seller and the correspondent bank whereby the correspondent
bank also becomes the confirming bank.2 3 This Article has assumed that the correspondent bank acts solely in an advisory capacity as a fully-disclosed agent of the issuing bank with no personal liability of its own. In fact, the sole advisory role for the
correspondent bank is seldom used. The seller is usually able to
negotiate a term into the underlying sales contract whereby the
letter of credit arrangement requires the correspondent bank also
to be the confirming bank. A confirming bank undertakes the
same obligations to the seller as does the issuing bank: to be primarily obligated to pay the seller in exchange for the documents
specified under the letter of credit. The exporting seller benefits
by having a local bank primarily obligated to pay on the delivery
of the specified documents as confirmation by a local bank enhances the seller's likelihood of recovery should it become neces24
sary for the seller to sue on the letter of credit.

American Foreign Trade Definitions as revised in 1941) are incorporated into
the international transaction by a specific contract term. The INCOTERMS are
in accord with UCC provisions. See HARms BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE
118-20 (5th ed. 1981). Under a C.I.F. contract the buyer "must make payment
against the tender of the required documents." UCC § 2-320(4).
22. The dishonor of a letter of credit by a correspondent bank also breaches
the underlying C.I.F. contract. See UCC § 2-320(4).
23. The fourth contractual relationship is based on "the contract between
the confirming bank and the seller under which the confirming bank undertakes
to pay to the seller (or to accept or negotiate without recourse to drawer bills of
exchange drawn by him) up to the amount of the credit against presentation of
the stipulated documents." U.C.M., [1982] 2 W.L.R. at 1045.
When payment is to be made through a confirming bank, the issuing bank

authorizes the confirming bank to make such payments and to remit the stipulated documents to the issuing bank when they are received. The issuing bank in

turn agrees to reimburse the confirming bank for payments made under the letter of credit. Id.
24. See C. SCHMrrTHOFF, supra note 1, at 259-60.
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II.

THE JURIDICAL NATURE OF LETTERS OF CREDIT

Several different theories attempt to justify the legal rationale
by which an irrevocable letter of credit imposes primary liability
on the confirming bank. First, the binding nature of an irrevocable letter of credit is arguably derived sui generis from statute
despite the apparent absence of consideration from the seller.
The Uniform Commercial Practices (UCP) provides that a confirming bank undertakes "to pay .. .if the credit provides for
payment."2 5 It is the practice in international trade to adhere to
this UCP provision and to consider the letter of credit to be binding on the issuing bank as soon as the credit is opened. 2 The
courts of the United Kingdom have adopted the sui generis approach. In United City Merchants Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Can25. UCP art. 3(b)(i). Article 3 provides in pertinent part:
a. An irrevocable credit constitutes a definite undertaking of the issuing
bank, provided that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied
with:
i. to pay.

. .

if the credit provides for payment ....

b. [w]hen an issuing'bank authorises or requests another bank to confirm
its irrevocable credit and the latter does so, such confirmation constitutes
a definite undertaking of the confirming bank in addition to the undertaking of the issuing bank, provided that the terms and conditions of the
credit are complied with:
i. to pay.

. .

if the credit provides for payment ....

A 1983 revision by the ICC became effective as of October 1, 1984. See C.
Schmitthoff, The New Uniform Customs for Letters of Credit,EXPORT 18,18-19
(May 1983).
26. A subsidiary question is whether the credit is opened when the issuing
bank sends the notice advising the seller (beneficiary) of the letter of credit or
when the seller actually receives the letter of credit. The author believes that the
binding effect should occur upon receipt by the beneficiary of the issuing bank's
letter. The issuing bank initiates the letter of credit, so until the beneficiary is
aware that a credit has been opened, there can be no acts in reliance on that
credit, and, therefore, no legal implications would attach. The legal rationale
associated with the making of an offer in contract law, and its interpretation in
the context of the "mailbox rule," is also compelling here. Applying this reasoning to an irrevocable letter of credit arrangement means that the credit would
remain revocable from the time the letter of credit was dispatched by the issuing/confirming bank until it was received by the beneficiary. The arrangement
would be irrevocable when the beneficiary received the letter or advice of the
credit. See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, § 18.04; see also UCC § 5-106(1)(b)
(discussing the timing and effect of the establishment of credit for the
beneficiary).
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ada,27 Lord Diplock declared a confirmed letter of credit to be a
"contract between the confirming bank and the seller under
which the confirming bank undertakes to pay to the seller.

. .

up

to the amount of the credit against presentation of the stipulated
documents. '2 In a frequently quoted passage from the earlier
2 9 Jenkins, L.J.
case of Malas v. British Imex Industries,
declared:

[T]he opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain
between the banker and the vender of the goods, which imposes
upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay .... An elaborate
commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers'
confirmed credits are of that character,and, in my judgment, it

would be wrong for this court in the present case to interfere with
that established practice.30
Neither court analyzed the contractual components in detail-they simply recognized the existence of a valid contract. In
English common law, therefore, the confirmation contract is simply a legal phenomenon derived sui generis from the UCP and
recognized by the courts.31
Second, the rights and obligations of the seller (beneficiary)
and confirming bank may be analyzed in the context of the thirdparty beneficiary theory.3 2 The rights and obligations of the seller
under the third-party beneficiary theory depend totally upon the
rights and obligations set forth in the contract between the confirming bank and the issuing bank-rights and obligations which
undoubtedly parallel those contained in the contract between the
issuing bank and its customer, the buyer. As the third-party beneficiary to the contract between the confirming bank and the issuing bank, the seller must comply with the terms contained in the
issuing bank's instructions to the confirming bank in order to receive payment. 33 If the terms embodied in the confirming bank's
instructions to the seller are more onerous than the terms of the
underlying contract between the buyer and seller, the seller is required to conform to the more burdensome terms in the confirm27. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039.
28. Id. at 1045.
29. [1958] 2 Q.B. 127 (C.A.).
30. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).

31. See id.
32.

33.

See E. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs 709-44 (1982).
See UCP art. 7; see also B. KoZOLCHYK, supra note 1, § 19.01.
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ing bank's instructions in order to receive payment.- A seller cannot force payment from the confirming bank simply on the basis
of its underlying contract with the buyer. 5
The converse is also true. A seller need comply only with the
instructions it receives from the confirming bank, even if the confirming bank's instructions to the seller dilutes the stringency of
any terms contained in the underlying contract between the
buyer and seller. A buyer, likewise, will not be able to prevent the
confirming bank from paying the seller by proving that its underlying contract with the buyer included provisions that were more
onerous than those contained in the confirming bank's instructions to the seller. 6 The third-party beneficiary theory as a rationale for imposing primary liability on the confirming bank,
therefore, is not at all convincing.
A third theory considers the confirming bank's letter to the
seller that sets forth the conditions prerequisite to payment to be
an offer. 37 In order for the confirming bank's advisory letter to the
seller to be an offer, however, bargained-for consideration must
be identified. The law of contracts generally provides that an offer may be withdrawn at any time prior to acceptance or upon
receipt of consideration by the offeror. Under this "offer" theory,
a confirming bank that has yet to receive any consideration in
return for its advisory letter should be able to revoke the offer. In
letter of credit transactions, however, the confirming bank is irrevocably bound as soon as the seller receives the advisory letter
that sets forth the offer.38 This theory, therefore, also fails to convincingly explain the binding nature of the confirmation
arrangement.
A fourth and much more persuasive theory also considers the
advisory letter sent by the confirming bank to be an offer, but
suggests in addition that the confirming bank is in effect bargaining for performance in the form of the seller's presentation of the
documents specified in the confirming bank's letter.3 9 When the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See UCP art. 8.
See id.
See id.
See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, at 135-43.
See B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 1, § 18.04.
This approach answers the drawbacks and criticisms presented in the

analysis of the offer theory as set out in B. KozOLCvYK,

INTERNATIONAL

ENCYCLO-

supra note 1, at 135-43. Furthermore, the author believes that modem
interpretations of the contract law theory of reliance have displaced the tradi-

PEDIA,
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seller, as offeree, begins the performance invited by the confirming bank's advisory letter, a secondary option contract is arguably
created.' 0 Support for this option contract theory is found in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "An offer which the offeror
[confirming bank] should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree
[seller] before acceptance and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent neces41

sary to avoid injustice.'

A confirming bank should expect its advisory letter to "induce
action. . . of a substantial character on the part of the [seller]. '42
The seller is not considered to have accepted the letter of credit
contract until the documents specified in the advisory letter are
presented to the confirming bank. An essential element of option
contracts is that time be of the essence. This requirement is met
because the seller only has the limited period of time specified in
the confirming bank's letter 4 3 in which to accept the offer. 44 The
typical international sales transaction, 5 however, requires the

tional offer theory as set forth in McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit, 35
HARV. L. REv. 539, 569 (1922); see also Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of
Credit Law, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 239, 251 (1982).
The preexisting duty rule, see McCurdy, supra, is an appropriate defense to a
claim of lack of consideration when raised by the buyer in his own behalf because the seller owes a legal duty to the buyer, not to the confirming bank (the
actual promisor on the confirmation obligation). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 73 and illustration 12 (1979) (repudiates the reasoning adopted in
McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515, 192 S.W. 681 (1917) where a duty owed a third
party effectively deprived a performance of the status of consideration when the
performance was rendered in return for the promise of a separate sum); see also
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 271-77 (1982).
40. "Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance
and does not invite a promissoryacceptance, an option contract is created when
the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of
it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(1) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 87(2).
42. Id.
43. UCP art. 37 provides: "All credits, whether revocable or irrevocable,
must stipulate an expiry date for presentation of documents for payment, acceptance or negotiation."
44. If no exact time is specified in the letter the confirming bank is obligated
to keep the credit open for a reasonable period of time-the reasonableness being measured by the particular circumstances of each case. See C. SCHMITTHOFF,
supra note 1, at 254-55.

45. These contracts are commonly referred to as C.I.F. or F.O.B. contracts.
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seller to contract with a carrier for the transportation of the goods
as well as the placement of those goods in the possession of the
carrier. Some international sales contracts4 6 also require the seller
to insure the contract goods against any damage or loss incurred
during transport. The contracts for carriage and insurance create
significant contractual obligations for the seller and, thus, are
clearly acts of a substantial character that have been induced by
the confirming bank's offer. 47 The parties must enter into carriage
and insurance contracts before the seller can formally accept the
letter of credit contract, which permits the seller to obtain the bill
of lading and appropriate insurance policies. The bill of lading,
insurance policies, and the invoice all must be presented to the
confirming bank within the period of time specified in the advisory letter.
The seller's change of position in reliance on the advisory letter
offer makes the offer binding on the confirming bank as offeror,
so it is both critical and equitable for the offer to remain open for
its stated duration. 48 The seller must have the full time allotment
in which to perform the acts specified by the advisory letter and
49
present the required documents to the confirming bank. It
would be a grave injustice to deny a seller payment after the
seller has arranged for the shipment of the contract goods and
insured those goods for transport. In effect, the carriage and insurance obligations incurred by the seller is consideration for the
confirming bank's contractual duty to keep the offer open.5 0 Thus,
under this theory, the presentation of conforming documents in
accordance with the confirming bank's instructions represents acceptance of the primary letter of credit contract, which then dis-

For an explanation of C.I.F. contracts, see supra note 21. For an explanation of
both see ICC INCOTERMS 1980.
46. C.I.F. contracts.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2).
48. An offer must remain open for the period of time specified in the advisory letter or for a reasonable time. See supra note 44.
49. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(2)-provides: "The offeror's
duty of performance under any option contract so created is conditional on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the terms of the

offer."
50. It is important to remember that the seller's legal duty is owed to the
buyer and not to the confirming bank-the actual promisor on the confirmation
obligation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 and illustration 12;
see also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 271-77 (1982).
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charges or supersedes the secondary option contract.51 The confirming bank's acceptance of the shipping documents crystallizes
its obligation to pay in accordance with the terms of its advisory
52
letter to the seller.
The presentation of noncomplying documents constitutes a
counteroffer by the seller,5 3 which may be rejected by the issuing
bank. At common law the counteroffer would repeal the bank's
original offer,54 but the option contract created by the seller's
commencement of performance preserves the issuing bank's original offer unless the requirements for discharge of the contractual
duty have been met.55
III.

THE MECHANICS OF ISSUING LETTERS OF CREDIT

Commercial letter of credit transactions ordinarily consist of
four successive stages: (1) the buyer opens the credit at the issuing bank; (2) the issuing bank communicates the credit to the
seller; (3) the seller or his agent presents the draft, demand, or
receipt of payment, accompanied by specified documents to the
correspondent bank; and (4) the confirming bank makes its acceptance and payment to the seller.5 A buyer applies for a letter
of credit with an issuing bank by means of a standard form in
which the buyer enumerates the terms to be included in the letter
of credit, states whether the credit will be revocable or irrevoca-

51. See supra note 49. See also NYUCC § 5-101 practice commentary (McKinney 1964); Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING
L.J. 596, 599 (1978); Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credit, 48 CORNELL
L.Q. 92, 105 (1962).
52. See supra note 49.
53. "Presentation of documents that are almost the same or which will do
just as well is a counter-offer that the issuer is entitled to reject. Were it otherwise, the issuer would sustain liability on account of an obligation he never undertook." Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARiz. L. Rnv. 239,
251 (1982) (emphasis added).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36 provides: "(1) An offeree's
power of acceptance may be terminated by (a) rejection or counter-offer by the
offeree. . . ." (emphasis added); see also id. § 39(2), which provides: "An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by his making of a counter-offer, unless the offeror has manifested a contrary intention or unless the counter-offer
manifests a contrary intention of the offeree." (emphasis added).
55. See id. § 37. The right to accept, however, is still limited by the express
expiry date. See supra notes 43 and 44.
56. B. KOZOLCHYK, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 7.
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ble, 5 and specifies whether the seller's drafts are to be sight
58
drafts or time drafts.

The buyer also will specify the documents that the seller must
present to the correspondent bank in order to receive payment. It
is essential that the seller present conforming documents. The
specific requirements of this clause, therefore, are of great concern to both the seller and the issuing bank. Because most international trade involves ocean shipping, a marine insurance policy
is ordinarily one of the conforming documents that is required to
be presented.5 9 The seller must also tender a commercial invoice

that specifically describes the goods to be shipped under the contract in order to receive payment.60 The correspondent bank then
compares the invoice description of the goods with the description contained in the letter of credit contract, and can reject the
invoice as nonconforming if there are any discrepancies.6 1 A correspondent bank's rejection of goods as nonconforming based
upon discrepancies between the invoice and letter of credit contract does not constitute a breach of contract by the rejecting
bank. Therefore, a rejection relieves the correspondent bank and
the issuing bank from liability for refusing to honor the seller's
drafts.
In practice, however, the buyer does not usually require the
goods to be described with specificity in the letter of credit contract. The complex nature of many international sales transactions precludes a complete and accurate comparison of the in57. Irrevocable credits are normally used. See A. LOWENFELD,

INTERNATIONAL

PRIVATE TRADE 91, n.j (1975) ("Revocable letters of credit exist, but ...

their.

purpose is simply to facilitate payment, without having the risk allocation function that the irrevocable letter has.")
58. See 2A J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS 5C-

1020 (1984). A sight draft is payable upon presentment to the issuing bank.

UCC § 3-108. A time draft allows for a delay between the time the seller ships

the goods and the time the issuing bank honors the draft. The delay gives the
buyer the advantage of receiving delivery of the goods before the issuing bank is

obligated to pay the seller on his matured drafts. The use of time drafts obviates
the need for the buyer to obtain an injunction to stop payment when problems

arise. As compensation for this trading advantage, and for use of the money
during the interim period, the seller will usually demand a premium in addition
to the customary contract price.

59. Id. at 5C-1006. A C.I.F. contract ordinarily requires the seller to insure

the goods under a policy of marine insurance.
60. See H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS ANDACEANCEs
61. See id. at 57-58.

57 (1974).
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voice and letter of credit descriptions by the correspondent
bank.2 Furthermore, the commercial invoice description of the
goods need not be exact in order to preserve the buyer's right to
reject the goods since the buyer can always sue the seller on the
underlying sales contract for goods that do not conform to the
description set forth in the sales contract.6 3 Finally, most international sales contracts require a bill of lading.6 4 The bill of lading
is evidence to the buyer that the goods have been put "on board"
a ship that is destined for the buyer's specified-point of delivery.
A bill of lading is made to the order of the issuing bank and
shows the date on which goods are shipped. 5 A buyer ordinarily
contracts for a "clean" bill of lading. 66
After the issuing bank accepts a letter of credit application, it
issues a letter of credit consistent with the terms contained in the
buyer's application. The issuing bank instructs a correspondent
bank of the letter of credit and its terms, and the correspondent
bank then issues an "Advice of Irrevocable Credit" that sets forth
the terms of the letter of credit to the seller. If the correspondent
bank is also the confirming bank, it also issues a confirmed letter
of credit to the seller which specifies its own obligations as the
confirming bank. 7

62. Id. at 58-59.
63. Id.
64. C.I.F. contracts usually require a bill of lading. See J. RABKIN & M JOHNsupra note 58, at 5C-1011. The buyer ordinarily requires the seller to produce a "full set of on board bills of lading to the order of [the issuing bank]...
SON,

and dated on or before [shipping date] evidencing shipment ......

Id.; see also

UCC § 1-201(6) which defines a bill of lading as "a document evidencing the
receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of
transporting or forwarding goods . ..

."

65. See J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 58, at 5C-1011.
66. A "clean" bill of lading contains no additions or deletions from that required by the underlying contract that would indicate that the goods shipped
are nonconforming. See Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust and Say. Ass'n, 218 F.2d 831, 838 (10th Cir. 1955).
67. See Schmitthoff, Confirmation in Export Transactions, 1957 J. Bus. L.
17; see also H. GUTTERIDGE & M. MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKs' COMMERCIAL
CREDITS 69 (6th ed. 1979).
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IV. IRREVOCABILITY, FRAUD, AND INJUNCTION
A.

Introduction

Letters of credit are made irrevocable in order to bind the issuing and confirming banks to their promise to pay the seller upon
the presentation of conforming documents. In a typical letter of
credit transaction, the issuing or confirming bank can only examine the tendered documents themselves to determine whether
or not the letter of credit requirements have been met. The underlying contract between the seller and the buyer is not considered to be the bank's concern."8
The duty of the confirming or issuing bank to be bound by the
terms of an irrevocable letter of credit stabilizes international
sales transactions because both buyers and sellers can rely on the
bank as a conduit of funds and not as a third party to their underlying sales contract. Recently, however, the increasing use of
injunctions by the courts in response to allegations of fraud in the
underlying sales contract have subjected this stable relationship
to the threat of collapse. 9
An action for fraud that seeks the equitable remedy of an in-

junction is the buyer's most common method of blocking payment
in a letter of credit transaction. In practice, the buyer usually attempts to enjoin the issuing bank from paying on the seller's

68. See UCP art. 8(a), which states: "In documentary credit operations all
parties concerned deal in documents and not in goods." See also UCC § 5114(1). UCC § 5-114, comment 1 states that any attempt by a bank to reserve
the right to dishonor if the documents do not conform to the underlying contract would be "declared invalid as essentially repugnant to an irrevocable letter
of credit."
69. See Harfield, EnjoiningLetter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J.
596 (1978); Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations,(pts. 1-2)
94 BANKING L.J. 424, 430, 493 (1977); see also Geva, Contractual Defenses as
Claims to the Instrument: The Right to Block Payment on a Banker's Instrument, 58 OR. L. REv. 283 (1979); Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit
Law, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 239, 242 (1982); Symons, Letters of Credit: Fraud, Good

Faith and the Basis for Injunctive Relief, 54 TuL. L. REv. 338 (1980); Note, A
Reconsideration of American Bell International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 19 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1981); Note, Judicial Development of
Letters of Credit Law: A Reappraisal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 144 (1980); Note,
"Fraudin the Transaction" Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian
Revolution, 93 HARv. L. REV. 992 (1980); Note, Letters of Credit:Injunction as a
Remedy for Fraud in UCC Section 5-114, 63 MINN. L. REv. 487 (1979).
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drafts, 0 which puts the issuing bank "on the horns of a dilemma." On one hand, the issuing bank is the agent of its customer, the buyer, and subject to the buyer's control. On the other
hand, the issuing bank is bound by its irrevocable promise in the
letter of credit to pay the seller upon the presentation of conforming documents. 1
B. United States Decisions
The general rule of law in letter of credit transactions is that it
is inappropriate for a court to enjoin the issuing bank from paying a seller on the basis of a dispute between the buyer and seller
that arises out of the underlying sales contract, absent some compelling equities.7 2 For example, in Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, a correspondent bank justified its refusal to
honor a seller's drafts by claiming that the tensile strength of the
newsprint sent per the specifications of the underlying sales contract did not conform to the specifications set forth in the letter
of credit contract.7 4 The seller filed suit asserting that the letter
of credit did not require the bank to examine the quality of the
goods purchased under the letter of credit contract.75 Ruling in
favor of the seller, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
bank had neither the right to demand that the paper be tested for
tensile strength nor the right to inspect the paper itself unless the
letter of credit specifically included such provisions.7 6 The presentation of documents, which on their face conformed to the terms

70. See Letters of Credit, supra note 69; see also H. FINKELSTEIN, supra.note
1 at 171.
71. See H. GUTTERIDGE & M MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKERS' COMMERCIAL
CREDITS 60-61 (6th ed. 1979); C. SCHMriTHOFF, supra note 1 at 259; see also 6
MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING ch. 12,

§ 32,

at 423-24 (perm. ed. 1975).

72. See A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE TRADE 109-11 (1975); see also
Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions,95 BANKING L.J. 596, 606-11
(1978).
73. 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
74. Id. at 394, 146 N.E. at 638. Rather than limiting its scrutiny to the documents as required by letter of credit obligations, the bank had examined the
goods to determine whether they were in conformity with the underlying sales
contract. See UCP art. 8(a); see also UCC § 5-114(1), comment 1, supra note 68.

75. See 239 N.Y. at 392-93, 146 N.E. at 638. The seller alleged that the correspondent bank's only duty was to ensure that the specified documents con-

formed to the letters of credit requirements.
76.

Id. at 396-97, 146 N.E. at 639.
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of the letter of credit, required the bank to pay the seller.7 7 Justice Cardozo, in his dissenting opinion, however, declared:
We are to bear in mind that this controversy is not one between
the bank... and... a holder of the drafts who has taken them
without notice and for value. The controversy arises between the
bank and a seller who has misrepresented the security upon which
advances are demanded. Between parties
so situated, payment may
78
be resisted if the documents are false.
While recognizing that the fraud defense would be ineffective
against a holder in due course, 79 Justice Cardozo implied that if
the seller presenting the drafts for payments had perpetrated the
fraud, the issuing bank may then be entitled to refuse payment if
the documentary fraud was discovered before payment was due. 0
Justice Cardozo's dissent suggests that any discrepancies between
the goods actually shipped and the goods described in the letter
of credit documents could be treated as proof that the documents
did not conform to the letter of credit. Such a conclusion would
properly support a refusal by the issuing bank to honor the
seller's draft on grounds of nonconformity of the tendered
documents.
The landmark "fraud in the letter of credit" case in the United
States is considered to be Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking
Corp."" In Sztejn, the Supreme Court of New York County ruled
that an injunction which prohibited the issuing bank from paying
on the seller's drafts was proper where the seller was contractually obligated to deliver bristles, but instead shipped worthless
boxes of cowhair, garbage, and rubbish.8 2 The court held:
No hardship will be caused by permitting the bank to refuse payment where fraud is claimed, where the merchandise is not merely
inferior in quality but consists of worthless rubbish ... [and]
where the bank has been given notice of the fraud before being

77. Id.

78. Id. at 401-02, 146 N.E. at 641 (emphasis added).
79. See UCC § 3-305.
80. 239 N.Y. at 402, 146 N.E. at 641.
81. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1941).
82. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635. The central issue in Sztejn was a determination of the duties and liabilities of the issuing bank. The court noted that the
terms of the letter of credit are controlling. It is the presentation of the appropriate shipping documents, not delivery of the goods, which obligates the issuing
bank to pay. Id. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633.

902

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

presented with the drafts and documents for payment ....

[Vol. 17:895
83

The court distinguished Maurice O'Mearaby emphasizing that
the issue in this case was not a question as to the quality of the
goods, but the fact that no goods (other than worthless rubbish)
had been shipped.8 4 The Szetjn court cited with approval the
portion of Cardozo's dissent in Maurice O'Mearas" which declared that a shipment of goods that was different from those described in the letter of credit documents would cause documents
to lack the requisite conformity because they failed to state truth-

fully what had actually been shipped.s6
The court's reasoning in Sztejn was followed in two later cases:
17
Merchants Corp. of America v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
and Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens and Southern National Bank."" In Merchants, the buyer notified the issuing bank
that the documents accompanying the seller's drafts were forgeries and sought to enjoin payment on the presentment of the allegedly fraudulent documents.8 9 The buyer alleged that the documents were fraudulent because they stated that the goods had
been shipped by the date specified in the contract when, in fact,
they had not.90 The New York Supreme Court treated the case as
83. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635. Although performance of the underlying
contract between the buyer and seller is generally immaterial and inadmissible
when determining the propriety of the issuing bank's actions, the court ruled
that when the bank was aware of fraud in the underlying transaction, the fundamental principle of separation which defined the bank's obligation to the seller
in letter of credit transactions should not protect the defrauding seller. The
court went on to distinguish a breach of warranty from active fraud in the context of commercial transactions. Id. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35.
84. Id. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34.
85. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
86. See supra text accompanying note 80.
87. 5 UCC REP. SERV. 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 5, 1968).
88. 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Dynamics is a diversity case involving
Georgia's version of UCC § 5-114. See GA. CODE ANN. § 109 A-5-114(2)(b) (1979
& Supp. 1984).
89. See 5 UCC REP. SERV. at 197.
90. Id. at 196. Plaintiffs became suspicious when three weeks elapsed between the agreed date for loading the goods in Korea and the date the documents were presented to the issuing bank for payment. After obtaining an order
to show cause, the buyer conducted an investigation that disclosed that the
goods had in fact been loaded after the agreed date of January 31, 1968, although the letter of credit documents stated that the deadline, which was a condition for honoring the seller's drafts, had been met. Defendant asserted that
the documents complied with the requirements of the letter of credit in all re-
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a single dispute involving the terms of the letter of credit and,
following Sztejn, reasoned that because the issuing bank had
knowledge of the forgery before the presentment of the seller's
draft and the bank's reliance upon this knowledge was based
"upon reasonable inquiry in the exercise of due care,"91 the bank
was not required to honor the seller's drafts and issued an injunction against payment.92
In Dynamics, Dynamics Corporation of America (DCA) contracted to sell defense-related communications equipment to the
Government of India."' In order to pay for this equipment, India
established a credit arrangement with the United States Government whereby the United States Government would pay DCA the
purchase price of the equipment when DCA's invoices were
presented by the Indian Government and accompanied India's
certification of specified facts.9 Under the contract DCA also
agreed to purchase irrevocable letters of credit from the issuing
bank, Citizens and Southern National Bank, in favor of the Indian Government at intervals that corresponded to the presentation of invoices to India by DCA. A letter of credit would be payable to India upon India's submission of certification to the
issuing bank that DCA had failed to perform its contractual obligations. 5 Subsequent to the time that performance began under
the contract, India went to war with Bangladesh." In response to
India's role in the war, the United States placed a partial embargo on military supplies going to India. The embargo included
the communications equipment sold by DCA. India, in turn, refused to certify any of DCA's invoices for payment and attempted
to draw upon the standby irrevocable letters of credit by submitting certification to the issuing bank that DCA had failed to perform its contractual obligations. 97 DCA sought to enjoin the issuing bank from honoring any of India's drafts drawn under the
letter of credit agreement by claiming that it was the embargo of
the United States Government, not any failure by DCA, that had
caused the equipment not to be delivered and, thus, the certifispects.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
356 F. Supp. at 993.

94. Id.

95. Id. at 993-94.
96. Id. at 994.
97. Id. at 994-95.
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cate submitted by India was fraudulent. 98 DCA based its allegation on a provision in the underlying sales contract that detailed
the proper means by which DCA was to deliver the equipment.
The Government of India, however, contended that the letter of
credit transactions were documentary sales and, therefore, were
independent of the underlying sales contract.
Although the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reiterated the general rule that letters of credit are independent of the primary sales contract, it recognized that the facts of
Dynamic presented a unique situation. The letters of credit were
purchased to give India added security for DCA's performance
not to obtain prompt payment. 99 The court found it conceptually
difficult to apply the Sztejn concept of fraud to the complicated
intergovernmental situation in Dynamic, but granted DCA's request for a preliminary injunction against payment on other
grounds 0 0 and ruled that the question of fraud was an issue of

98. Id. at 996. DCA's claim for injunctive relief was two-pronged. First, DCA
alleged that the certificate submitted by India which claimed DCA had breached
its contractual obligations was erroneous and fraudulent since DCA, by reason of
the F.O.B. shipping term in the contract, had affected proper delivery of the
equipment when it was prevented from shipping solely because of the United
States embargo. Second, DCA alleged that the certificate required to accompany
the sight draft was not in strict compliance with the letter of credit specifications because it was not signed by the President of India. Id.
India argued first that the court could not even consider the underlying sales
contract because letter of credit transactions deal only with documents, and second that it was a ridiculous and erroneous interpretation of the letter of credit
to contend that the President of India was actually required to sign the certificate. See id. at 996-97. "India notes that the Constitution of the Union of India
empowers the Joint Secretary to the Government to sign documents on his President's behalf and that the Joint Secretary signed other agreements on his President's behalf in dealings with DCA without objection from DCA." Id. at 997.
99. Id. at 996. DCA received prompt payment for deliveries to India under
the contract from the United States Government. See supra text accompanying
note 94.
100. The court stated that:
A preliminary injunction is designed to preserve the status quo ....

An

injunction against the Bank would merely require it to continue holding
on to the Deposit. If plaintiffs application were denied, the Deposit would
be on its way to India, as would plaintiff's remedy, and plaintiff, which has
already filed a petition in bankruptcy, would be severely disadvantaged
It would not appear that India would be seriously disadvantaged by
Acsome further delay and the entry of a preliminary injunction ....
....

cordingly, the court concludes that a preliminary injunction is warranted.
Id. at 999-1000.
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fact to be explored at trial. 11 The court asserted, however, that a
permanent injunction against payment would be proper if the
02
trial court determined that India's certificate was fraudulent.
C.

The Uniform Commercial Code

The comprehensive regulation of letters of credit is codified in
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).10 3 Prior to the
passage of Article 5, the principles applied in regulating letters of
credit in the United States were drawn from either the UCP or
New York case law.104 Section 5-114(1) mandates the doctrine of
separation 0 5 by providing:
An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether

101. Id. at 998.
102. Id.
103. See B. KOZOLCHYK, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 11.
104. New York case law was applied in the regulation of letters of credit
because of the dominance of the port of New York in international trade. See
NYUCC § 5-101 official comment and New York annotations (McKinney 1964).
After article 5 was enacted the New York Legislature chose to retain the UCP
through section 5-102(4) of its UCC, subject to the intention of the parties who
created the letter of credit and subjected themselves to New York law.
Some commentators have suggested that this legislative choice "amounts to
an abdication by the New York Legislature and in practice will probably be an
incorporation by reference of the UCP." NYUCC § 5-102 practice commentary
(McKinney 1964). The New York Legislature's decision undoubtedly stemmed
from the potential multi-billion dollar loss of international trade that might
have resulted from forcing importers and exporters to abandon centuries of empirically developed common law for new and untried statutory regulations.
Section 5-102(4) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, this Article 5 does not apply to a letter of
credit or a credit if by its terms or by agreement, course of dealing or
usage of trade such letter of credit or credit is subject in whole or in part
to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits fixed by the thirteenth or any subsequent Congress of the International
Chamber of Commerce.
NYUCC § 5-102(4).
Alabama and Missouri have also adopted the "New York Amendment." UCC
§ 5-102, 2A U.L.A. 226 (1985). For a discussion on how portions of Article 5
might seep into commercial credit transactions governed by the UCP, see
Eberth & Ellinger, Assignment and Presentationof Documents in Commercial
Credit Transactions, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 277, 296-97 (1982).
105. See H. GUTTERIDGE & M. MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKERS' COmRCIAL
CREDITS 62-65, 88-94 (6th ed. 1979).
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the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for
sale or other contract between the customer and the beneficiary.
The issuer is not excused from honor of such a draft or demand by
reason of an additional general term that all documents must be
satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer0 6 may require that specified
documents must be satisfactory to it.2

Section 5-114(1), however, does not mention the companion doctrine of strict compliance. 107 Pre-Code case law, therefore, must
be applied to determine whether documents are in compliance
with the letter of credit terms.108 Because pre-Code case law in
New York adhered to the doctrine of strict compliance, 109 and
that doctrine continues to be applied in Nev York courts,110 adherence to the doctrine presumably continues elsewhere "via
[UCC] section 1-103 on supplemental general principles."",, The
failure of UCC section 5-114(1) to mention the doctrine of strict
compliance appears to be of little significance.
UCC section 5-114(2) codified the Sztejn holding by providing
that:
Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to
comply with the terms of a credit but a required document does
not in fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title ... or of a certificated security ... or is
forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction: (a) the
issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by a . . .holder in due course . . . and (b) in all other

cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may
honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from
the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the
face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may
enjoin such honor. 112
Other courts have applied the Sztejn principles in similar fact
106. UCc § 5-114(1) (emphasis added).

107. See B.

KOZOLCHYK,

supra note 1, at 259-62; see also C. SCHMrrTHOFF,

supra note 1, at 248-50; see generally R.B. Schlesinger Study, 3 N.Y. STATE REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, at 1571-1719 (1955).
108. "[C]ourt decisions must serve as a source of gap-filler law under Article

Five." J.

WHITE & R. SUMimRS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 718 (2nd ed. 1980).

109. See B. KoZOLCnK, supra note 1, at 258-59 and cases cited in n.5.
110. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 108, at 729.
111. Id. (footnote omitted).
112. UCC § 5-114(2) (emphasis added).
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situations. In United Bank v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp.,113 the New York Court of Appeals relied on Sztejn and
UCC section 5-114 in denying payment to a seller under a letter
of credit transaction. In United Bank, the buyer, Cambridge
Sporting Goods (Cambridge), contracted to purchase boxing
gloves from the seller, Duke Sports (Duke), a Pakistani corporation. Cambridge opened an irrevocable letter of credit with
United Bank (issuing bank) in favor of Duke. After denying
Duke's request for an extension of time for performance on the
underlying contract, Cambridge cancelled the entire arrangement
with Duke and notified the issuing bank of the cancellation. In
spite of the cancellation, Duke sought payment on the letter of
credit by presenting conforming documents. An inspection of the
goods upon their arrival revealed that Duke had shipped old, unpadded, ripped, and mildewed gloves, not the new gloves required
by the underlying contract. Cambridge, therefore, sought to enjoin the issuing bank from paying Duke under the letter of credit.
The court denied payment to Duke on the strength of the principles articulated in Sztejn and UCC section 5-114.114
Several other jurisdictions have recognized the Sztejn case as
either a basis for UCC section 5-114 or as an exception to the
general rule that a letter of credit is independent of an underlying
sales contract.115 Although courts vary in their willingness to
grant injunctive relief, a clear showing of active fraud in the underlying transaction should enable a buyer to obtain injunctive
relief.
D.

United Kingdom Decisions

The doctrine set forth in Sztejn was first recognized by English
courts in the 1975 case of Discount Records v. Barclays Banks."6
113. 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
114. Id. at 259, 360 N.E.2d at 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The court commented that § 5-114(2) "represents a codification of precode case law most eminently articulated in the landmark case of Sztejn v. Schroeder Banking Corp."
Id.
115. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991
(N.D. Ga. 1973); Edgewater Const. Co. v. Wilson Mfg. & Fin., 44 Ill. App. 3d
220, 357 N.E.2d 1307 (1976); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn.
452, 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296 N.C. 212,
250 S.E.2d 587 (1978); Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 336
A.2d 316 (1975).
116. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315 (Ch.).
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While recognizing the persuasive authority of Sztejn, the Discount court refused to grant the buyer an interlocutory injunction
to stop payment on a draft issued under a letter of credit agreement. 117 A buyer contracted to purchase certain records and cartridges from a French company and arranged for the purchase to
be financed through a letter of credit. The buyer instructed the
issuing bank to issue an irrevocable, confirmed letter of credit in
favor of the French seller. 1 " Upon receipt of the goods, the buyer
discovered that only a fraction of the goods complied with the
terms of the contract, the remainder being rubbish or goods that
had not been ordered."l 9 Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of New York in Sztejn, the buyer attempted to enjoin the
issuing bank from paying on the seller's draft. 20 The Discount
12
court denied the buyer's request for temporary injunctive relief, '
and distinguished Sztejn on two grounds. First, because the
Sztejn court was ruling on a motion to dismiss a cause of action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, it
was required to assume that the facts alleged were true.122 Thus,
the Sztejn court was dealing with a case of established fraud. In
Discount, however, the buyer had made an allegation of fraud,
but the fraud itself had not yet been established. 123 The court believed it would be difficult to adequately resolve the issue of fraud
because the seller was not a party to the action. Justice Megarry
117. Id. at 320.
118. The credit was made through a second bank, which sent instructions to
a third French bank to open an irrevocable credit with a fourth bank. The seller
placed the goods with a carrier and the buyer's account was debited for the contract price. The funds were then placed in a joint account of the first bank and
the buyer. Id. at 316-17.
119. Out of ninety-four cartons, two were empty, five were filled with rub-

bish or packing, twenty-five record boxes and three cassette boxes were only
partially filled, and two boxes labelled as cassettes were filled with records. The

buyer received only 518 of the 825 cassettes specified in the underlying contract,
and 75% of the 518 cassettes delivered were nonconforming. Only 12 different

records were sent instead of the 112 different records required by the sales contract, and of 8,625 records ordered, only 275 were in compliance with the contract. The serial numbers on the shipping cartons had been changed, seemingly
to comply with the contract order, and the serial numbers of the records inside

had been pasted over with semitransparent material. Id. at 317-18.
120. The buyer also attempted to enjoin payment of any sum to any other
party pursuant to the letter of credit. See id. at 318-19.
121. Id. at 320.
122. Id. at 319.
123. Id.
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concluded that "accordingly, the matter has to be dealt with on
the footing that this is a case in which fraud is alleged but has not
been established.

' 124

Second, the Discount court stated that judi-

cial interference should not be invoked in this type of commercial
transaction unless there was a showing of sufficiently grave
cause. 12 5 The court reasoned that without a showing of grave
cause a plaintiff should be required to pursue its claim in contract
based on proof of a contractual breach in the underlying commer6
cial transaction.

12

In two subsequent cases, English courts reaffirmed Discount

and denied injunctive relief.1 27 In Harbottle v. National West-

minster Bank,128 the court adopted the reasoning of Sztejn, but
stated that a buyer must establish either a clear case of fraud or
other exceptional circumstances in order to enjoin a bank's payment on its irrevocable obligation. 129 In its final analysis, the
court ruled that "[t]he present case is a long way from [Sztejn]
and also much weaker on its facts than the Discount Records
case."' 30 In Edward Owen Ltd. v. Barclays Bank' 3' the court acknowledged that the issuing bank's strict obligation to pay under
a confirmed irrevocable letter of credit was the established doctrine, 132 but recognized the Sztejn exception when the bank had
knowledge of fraud in the underlying transaction: 133
[I]f the documents are presented by the beneficiary himself, and
are forged or fraudulent, the bank is entitled to refuse payment if
it finds out before payment, and is entitled to recover the money as
124. Id.
125. Id. at 320.
126. In addition, the court reasoned that as a result of the intricacies in the
instant transaction, see supra note 118, the bill of exchange may have already
passed to a holder in due course, and if so, the Sztejn doctrine clearly would not
apply. [1975] 1 W.L.R. at 319-20.
127. Harbottle Ltd. v. National Westminster Bank, [1977] W.L.R. 752
(Q.B.); Edward Owen Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764 (C.A.). In both
cases the ex parte injunctions obtained by the respective buyers were discharged. See Ellinger, Fraud in Documentary Credit Transaction,1981 J. Bus.
L. 258.
128. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 752 (Q.B.).
129. Id. at 762.
130. Id.
131. [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764 (C.A.).
132. Id. at 771.
133. Id. at 771-72.
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34
paid under a mistake of fact if it finds out after payment.1

On the facts of Edward Owen, however, the Court of Appeal held
had not been
that the requirements of the Sztejn fraud 1exception
35
met, and payment could not be enjoined.

The preceding English cases typify the difficulty courts have
had in determining the parameters of clear fraud in letter of
credit transactions. Undoubtedly, in order to apply the Sztejn exception, a plaintiff must be able to present compelling evidence of
fraud. 136 The House of Lords in United City Merchants Ltd. v.
Royal Bank of Canada,3 7 shed some light on the parameters of

the Sztejn fraud exception in English courts. In U.C.M., the seller
and its assignee brought suit against the confirming bank, Royal
Bank of Canada, for payment under an irrevocable, transferable
letter of credit. Vitro, a Peruvian company, had contracted with
the seller to purchase equipment for use in the manufacture of
glass fiber and had arranged for the purchase to be financed by a
letter of credit. Under the terms of the sales contract, the seller
was to ship the equipment from London to Peru on a specified
date. In fact, the goods were shipped a day late and from Felixstowe, not London. The carriers, however, fraudulently altered
the bills of lading to show that the shipment had occurred on the
specified date and from London as required in the letter of credit
instructions. Neither the seller nor its assignee knew of the fraudulent alteration when the assignee presented the documents to
the confirming bank for payment. The confirming bank learned of
the fraudulent alteration, rejected the documents, and refused to
pay on the letter of credit. On the letter of credit issue, the High
Court found for the seller and assignee, 38 but was subsequently
134. Id. at 772 (quoting Browne, J., in the unreported case of first impression, Bank Russo-Iran v. Gordon, Woodroffe & Co. Ltd., The Times (London),
Oct. 4, 1972).
135. Id. at 774, 776, 777.
136. As one commentator observed, in Discount, even though the buyer
opened some of the goods in the presence of one of the defendants, the court
still found no compelling evidence of fraud. See Goode, Reflections on Letters of
Credit-I, 1980 J. Bus. L. 291.
137. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039 (H.L.); see 1982 J. Bus. L. 319.
138. [1979] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 267, 278 (Q.B.); see 1979 J. Bus. L. 268. In addition to the letter of credit issue, the case dealt with the legality of the contract
in light of article VIII section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Order in

Council of 1946.
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reversed by the Court of Appeal.13 9 On appeal the House of Lords
reversed the Court of Appeal and restored the decision of the
High Court.140 The House of Lords reasoned that while the
Sztejn fraud exception was recognized by the law of the United
Kingdom its application should be limited to cases in which the
fraud was committed by a presenting seller and should not be extended to every situation in which the issuing or confirming bank
gains knowledge of the underlying fraud.'
V.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO FRAUD IN LETTER OF CREDIT
TRANSACTIONS

The burden of establishing the existence of fraud in letter of
credit transactions rests upon the party alleging fraud. Courts
that have adopted Sztejn have applied various standards of proof
in determining when the burden of persuasion has been discharged. 42 Because a unilateral claim of fraud would be insubstantial, 143 the party alleging fraud must establish both that the
fraud existed under the appropriate standard of proof, and that
the bank had notice of the fraud. 4 4 Courts in the United Kingdom require the party alleging fraud to show a sufficiently grave
cause to justify a finding of fraud, 4 5 and courts in both the
United States and the United Kingdom recognize the defense of a
146
holder in due course status.

139.
140.

[1981] 3 W.L.R. 242 (C.A.); see 1981 J. Bus. L. 221, 381.
[1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1049 (H.L.).

141. Id. at 1045-46.
142.

Standards that have been used include an irrebuttable presumption,

Sztejn, 177 Misc. 719, 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1941), and a preponderance of the factual evidence, Dynamics, 356 F. Supp. 991, 998 (N.D. Ga.

1973).
143. See Discount [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315, 319 (Ch.).
144. See e.g., Sztejn, 177 Misc. 719, 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct.
1941). The Sztejn court found that the issuing bank had received notice of the
seller's active fraud before it either accepted or made payment on the seller's

draft.
145. See e.g., Discount, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 315, 320 (Ch.).
146. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635. In Sztejn, the court emphasized that the issuing bank acted as a seller's agent for collection, not as a
holder in due course. The court pointed out, however, that if the bank presenting the draft is a holder in due course, its claim for payment could prevail notwithstanding any fraud in the underlying transaction. This position of the
Sztejn court has been reiterated elsewhere. See Banco Espanol de Credito v.
State St. Bank and Trust, 409 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1969); see also Annot., 35 ALR
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Courts that have not relied on the Sztejn fraud exception often
use other theories to distinguish the type of fraud involved in
Sztejn.1 47 When a seller resorts to the type of egregious fraud in
the underlying transaction that leaves the buyer and, thus, the
issuing bank little or nothing of value, the goals of preventing
fraud and protecting innocent parties justify allowing an issuing
bank to refuse to honor a draft even when presented with conforming documents.148
Courts generally analyze fraud in letter of credit transactions in
one of three ways: (1) the "unqualified liability" approach, (2) the
Sztejn fraud exception approach, or (3) the UCC approach. The
approach adopted by a court is significant to the banks because
the determination of a bank's liability for actions taken after the
bank receives notice of alleged fraud differs under each approach.
A confirming bank has three alternatives when potentially fraudulent documents have been presented. The bank can honor the
draft, refuse to honor the draft, or seek to have payment of the
draft enjoined. The consequences to the bank of each alternative
will be analyzed with respect to the three judicial approaches for
dealing with fraud in letter of credit transactions.
A. The Unqualified Liability Approach
Under the "unqualified liability" approach espoused in the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits
(UCP) 149 and followed in U.C.M. u. Royal Bank of Canada,150 an
3d 1397; UCC § 5-114(1), (2)(a) and (b); United Bank v. Cambridge Sporting
Goods, 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976); Discount [1975]
1 W.L.R. 315.
147. See W. Va. Housing Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Pa.
1976).
148. This refusal is valid when the buyer and issuing bank are left with
"trash rather than treasure." Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law,
24 ARiz. L. REv. 239, 245 (1982); see also Harfield, Enjoining Letters of Credit

Transactions,95 BANKING L.J. 596, 603 (1978); Megrah, Risk Aspects of the Irrevocable Documentary Credit, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 255, 258 (1982).
149. See Schmitthoff, The New Uniform Customs for Letters of Credit, ExPORT 18 (May 1983). The ICC has standardized banking practices concerning

documentary credits by formulating the UCP. Professor Schmitthoff has observed that the international organization has been very successful and its efforts have achieved global effect. C.SCHMrrTHOFF, supra note 1, at 246. According to the author, the UCP had been adopted by banks and banking associations
in 175 countries and territories by March 1974. Id.
150. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
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issuing or confirming bank must pay on a draft when presented
with conforming documents because in letter of credit transactions the bank is considered to deal in documents and not in
goods. 151 If the bank receives notice of the alleged fraud, and is
later presented with conforming documents, the bank may still
honor the draft without liability. In fact, if the bank refuses to
honor the draft, it will be liable to the seller because its responsibility is limited to an examination of the specified documents for
conformity. The UCP does not provide for judicial injunction of
payment.
The UCP clearly provides that neither the issuing nor confirming bank has a duty to investigate a claim of fraud. 1 2 The documents received by the bank, however, are evidence that goods
have been shipped. In addition, limiting the bank's duties to a
documentary inquiry reduces the bank's cost of credit and, thus,
the rates charged to its customers because the bank serves as a
conduit for funds but does not get involved in disputes between
the buyer and seller.
Prior to Sztejn, United States common law recognized that a
bilateral agreement between the parties could displace the general
rule of separation. 5 3 A letter of credit could incorporate the
terms of the underlying sales contract and require the issuing
bank to examine the quality and conformity of the goods shipped,
as well as to inspect the documents. Where the letter of credit
does not incorporate the underlying contract, the buyer is considered to have made a deliberate choice to instruct the issuing bank
to adhere to an "unqualified obligation." The "unqualified liabil-

151. Even though the UCP applies to letter of credit transactions, the buyer
may also be able to stop payment if egregious fraud can be established under
UCC § 5-114. See United Bank v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265,
41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943 (1976).
152. See UCP art. 8, supra note 68. UCP art. 9 provides: "Banks assume no
liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy,genuineness,falsification or legal effect of any documents." (emphasis added). Id.; see also Gian
Singh & Co. v. Banque de L'Indochine [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1234, cited with approval by Lord Diplock in U.C.M., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1046.
153. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 721, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34. "If the buyer and the
seller intended the bank to [go behind the documents and examine the goods]
they could have so provided in the letter of credit itself.

. .

." Id. The summary

of facts in Sztejn does not indicate, nor does it seem likely, that the letter of
credit issued by the bank contained such terms because the court emphasized
the fraudulent activity of the seller. Id. at 721-22, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
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ity" approach may, however, be overly formalistic.15 4 It is discussed simply for purposes of theoretical completeness and does
not represent the law in any domestic or international
jurisdiction. 155
B.

The Sztejn Fraud Exception

The "Sztejn fraud exception" provides that the issuing bank
may refuse to honor the draft if the seller or his agent fraudulently presents to the conforming bank documents that expressly
or impliedly contain material misrepresentations of fact, and the
issuing bank learns of the fraud before the draft is presented. According to this approach, the "principle of the independence of

the bank's obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller." 158 If the issuing bank

has knowledge of the fraud and honors the draft, the bank will be
liable to the buyer unless it can establish that it was acting in
good faith within the requirements of UCC section 5-114(2)(b), or
unless the presenter was a holder in due course. 57 On the other
hand, if the bank refuses to honor the draft, the bank would only
be liable if the draft was presented by a holder in due course. 158
154. This formalism would not evade the eye of equity. See (in another context) Parkin v. Thorold (1852), 16 Beav. 59, 66-67:
...Courts of Equity make a distinction in all cases between that which is
[a] matter of substance and that which is [a] matter of form; and if it
find[s], that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it
holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and
thereby defeat the substance. Id.(emphasis added).
155. See supra notes 83, 107 and accompanying text; see also B. KOZOLCHYK,
supra note 1 at 528-31; Stouffiet, Payment and Transfer in Documentary Letters of Credit: Interaction Between the French General Law of Obligationsand
the Uniform Customs and Practice, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 267, 272-73 (1982). The
House of Lords in England is the highest court in the Anglo-American common
law system to consider the issue and to categorically reject the unqualified liability approach. The court declared, "[t]o this general statement of principle [the
unqualified liability approach] as to the contractual obligations of the confirming bank to the seller, there is one established exception: [the Sztejn fraud exception]." U.C.M., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1045.
156. Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
157. See supra note 146. The seller in these circumstances could not enjoy
the status of holder in due course. See Geva, ContractualDefenses as Claims to
the Instrument:The Right to Block Payment on a Banker's Instrument, 58 OR.
L. REv. 283, 296 (1979).
158. The UCC requirement of good faith would also be applicable under
these circumstances. UCC § 5-114(2)(b).
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The Sztejn fraud exception typically enables the buyer to enjoin
payment to the fraudulent seller in a letter of credit
transaction. 159
Although the fraud exception was first articulated by Justice
Shientag in the Sztejn decision, it is based upon well-founded
common law concepts. A leading jurist and practitioner in the law
of letters of credit has noted that "[o]f crucial importance, however, is that Justice Shientag invented no novel concepts, but
rather affirmed, after scholarly review, the judicial endorsement
of commercial practice. Indeed, his opinion should be read as a
limitationon judicial interference with the performance of a letter of credit."16 0 The Sztejn fraud exception requires an initial
determination as to the appropriateness of judicial interference.
The crucial factor in determining the propriety of any judicial interference is whether or not the fraud is material enough to negate the confirming or issuing bank's obligation to pay upon presentation of the documents. The House of Lords in U.C.M.
described the focus of the Court of Appeal as whether "any of the
documents presented under the credit by the seller/beneficiary
contain[ed] a material misrepresentation of fact that was false to
the knowledge of the person who issued the document and intended by him to deceive persons into whose hands the document
might come."16 If the documents presented by the seller contain
a material misrepresentation, and those documents were knowingly issued with the intent to deceive, the bank's obligation to
pay is negated and an injunction can properly be ordered. 6 2 The
English Court of Appeal explicitly extended the fraud exception
set forth in U.C.M. to include:
"[s]ituations of fraud in which the wrongdoing of the beneficiary
has so vitiated the entire transaction that the legitimate purposes
of the independence of the issuer's obligation would no longer by
[sic] served." [The fraud exception] should also be applied to any
fraud which, if known to the issuing or confirming bank, would en159. It must be remembered, however, that if a presenter other than the
seller is a holder in due course, or if the bank acts in bad faith, the court will not
block payment by granting an injunction.
160. Harfield, EnjoiningLetter of Credit Transactions,95 BANKING L.J. 596,
603 (1978) (emphasis added).
161. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1048 (This "half-way house" approach, which
Lord Diplock criticizes, was used by the English Court of Appeal in reaching its
decision in U.C.M., [1981] 3 W.L.R. 242).
162. See U.C.M., [1981] 3 W.L.R. 242, 269.
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title it to refuse payment. . . . So here the defendants [the issuing
or confirming bank], when they knew. . that they had been intentionally deceived as to a date material to their liability to pay,
were right to refuse to honour the plaintiff's credit. Even though
the judge was not able to find that [the person who intentionally
made the misrepresentation] was the plaintiff's agent in making
116
the bill of lading for presentation to the defendants ....
The application of the fraud exception by the Court of Appeal
in U.C.M. is a perfect example of the judicial interference against
which Harfield warns.1 6 4 The noted legal scholar C. M. Schmitthoff, however, loathes the proposition that a confirming or issuing
bank must pay the seller when the documents presented were
fraudulently issued by someone other than the seller and the
bank was aware of the fraud.1 6 5 The proper question, however, is
not whether payment should be made, but whether the seller of
the documents should be paid. The answer to that question depends upon characterizing a letter of credit transaction as a sale
of documents. The fundamental doctrine of separation in letter of
credit transactions stands for the proposition that absent any definite involvement in the actual fraud by the seller, the confirming
bank is obligated to purchase the documents from the seller, and
the seller is obligated to sell them to the confirming bank "as is,"
barring any personal representations to the contrary."66 The
"half-way house" approach articulated in U.C.M. 167 employs an

163. Id. at 269-70 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
164. See supra text accompanying note 160.
165. "I prefer the well-reasoned judgment of the Court of Appeal [U.C.M. v.
Royal Bank of Canada [1981] 3 W.L.R. 242], according to which the confirming
bank need not honour the credit once fraud is established, irrespective of what
kind of fraud it is and who committed the fraud." Schmitthoff, A Great Case on
Letters of Credit, EXPORT 3, 4 (July-Aug. 1982) (emphasis added). "It would be
desirable that the next revision of the [UCP] . . . should expressly authorise
banks to refuse honouring a credit if fraud is established, irrespective of
whether it is further proved that the seller or other beneficiary is a party to the
fraud." Schmitthoff, Export Trade: Fraud in Documentary Credit Transactions; Obligation of Bank to Pay with Knowledge of Fraud, 1982 J. Bus. L. 321
(emphasis added).
166. See Harfield, EnjoiningLetter of Credit Transactions,95 BANKING L.J.
596, 614 (1978); Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARiz. L.
REv. 239, 242-43 (1982). See also H. GUTTERIDGE & M. MEGRAH, THE LAW OF
BANKERS' COMMERCIAL CREmTS 137-45 (6th ed. 1979); C. SCHmITTHOFF, supra
note 1, at 269.
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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"objective fraud" standard to deny payment to the seller if there
were any fraudulent misrepresentations in the credit documents,
regardless of whether the seller has been implicated in the fraud.
One commentator has asserted that "[tihe potential for mischief
lies in improper extrapolation from [Sztejn] rather than in application of the [fraud exception] rationale, '168 and cites the "half16 9
way house" approach as an example.
In U.C.M., the House of Lords explicitly rejected the "half-way
house" approach through a strict reading of the court's rationale
in the Sztejn holding. 170 The focus of the House of Lords in
U.C.M. was not whether the seller knew of an inherent lie within
the documents, but whether the lie contained in the documents
had consciously been made by the seller."' The House of Lords
narrowed the fraud exception previously articulated by the Court
of Appeal: "[t]here is one established exception: that is, where the
seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently
presents to the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that to
17 2
his knowledge are untrue."
Because the seller in U.C.M. was unaware of the inaccuracy in
the bill of lading, the fraudulent acts of the shippers did not fall
within the House of Lords' fraud exception. The fraud exception
seems to be limited to those "[s]ituations of fraud in which the
wrongdoing of the [seller] has so vitiated the entire transaction
that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer's
obligation would no longer be served."1 73

168. See Harfield, EnjoiningLetter of Credit Transactions,95 BANKING L.J.
596, 614 (1978).
169. See Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARiz. L. REv.
239, 242-43. In Sztejn, Justice Shientag was concerned with preventing the "unscrupulous seller" from obtaining shelter under the umbrella of the fundamental
doctrine of separation in letter of credit transactions. In U.C.M., [1982] 2
W.L.R. 1039, the seller was not unscrupulous, but on the contrary, was in fact a
victim of the fraud.
170. U.C.M., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1048-49. In U.C.M., the seller was not
unscrupulous: "the sellers [were] unaware of the inaccuracy ... of the date at
which the goods were actually on board....
They believed that it was true and
that the goods had actually been loaded . . . as required by the documentary
credit." Id. at 1045.
171. Id. at 1048-49.
172. Id. at 1045 (emphasis added).
173. Intraworld Indus. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 359, 336 A.2d 316,
324-25 (1975).
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C. The UCC Approach Under Article 5
UCC section 5-114(2)(b) empowers a confirming or issuing bank
to either honor or dishonor a draft that is presented with fraudulent documents. 17 4 As discussed above, if the bank in good faith

honors a draft after receiving notice of an alleged fraud in the
underlying transaction, the bank is not liable. A bank may properly refuse to honor a draft except when the presenter is a holder
in due
course 175 or the seller's behavior was not "unscrupu'17 6
lous.

In either of the latter two circumstances, the bank is lia-

ble to the seller. In addition, a court may enjoin the bank from
honoring the seller's draft if the fraud exception requirements
under UCC section 5-114(2)(b) are met.
One commentator has categorized the problems of section 5114(2) as "definitional and structural."1

The terms "forged,"

"fraudulent," and "fraud in the transaction" are neither defined
in the text of the UCC nor elaborated upon in the comments. 7 8
The Court of Appeal decision in U.C.M. discussed the common
law Sztejn fraud exception and distinguished the terms "forged"
and "fraudulent"17 9 as the difference:
[b]etween a document which was inaccurate and a document which
was false, or between a document which was false to the knowledge
of its maker and a document which he forged .... A document

may tell a lie about itself, e.g., about the person who made it, or
the time or place of making. If it tells a lie about the maker, it is a
forgery; if it tells a lie about the time or place of making "where
either is material," it is a forgery .... In the former case it may
be a nullity, in the latter not .... Or the document may tell a lie

about its contents. Then it is no forgery, but the maker or utterer
of it may commit ... some kind of fraud. Or a document may be

untrue in the sense of inaccurate by mistake and without any in174. UCC § 5-114(2)(b).
175. See supra note 159. Notice of fraud, however, deprives correspondent
banks of holder in due course status. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods, 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
176. See Sztejn, 177 Misc. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see also W. Va. Housing Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1976); New York Life Ins.
v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust, 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d 562 (1977).
177. Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction as a Remedy for Fraud in U.C.C.
Section 5-114, 63 MINN. L. REv. 487, 497 (1979).
178. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 108, at 736.
179. U.C.M., [19811 3 W.L.R. 242, 262.
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tention to deceive by its maker or anyone who puts it forward.180
The House of Lords limited application of the Sztejn fraud exception in English courts to intentional behavior, including forgeries or fraudulent acts by the seller and acts done with the
seller's knowledge or implied acquiescence.'8 1
The definitions of "forgery" and "fraudulent" articulated in
cases decided under the UCC are often disparate and incorporate
both common law and equity principles."8 2 The UCC, however,
fails to indicate whether a bank's refusal to honor a draft is justified only when the fraudulent acts were performed by, or with the
implied acquiescence of, the seller, or whether a bank's refusal is
also justified when the fraudulent acts were committed by persons independent of the seller acting without his knowledge. The
"half-way house" approach that was rejected by the House of
Lords in U.C.M., therefore, may satisfy the UCC section 5-114(2)
"forgery" and "fraudulent" definitions:
[I]f any of the documents presented under the credit by the seller/
beneficiary contain a material misrepresentation of fact that was
false to the knowledge of the person who issued the document and
intended by him to deceive persons into whose hands the document might come, the confirming bank is under no liability to honour the credit, even though, as in the instant case, the persons
whom the issuer of the document intended to, and did, deceive included the seller/beneficiary himself."8
This interpretation would clearly extend the definitions of "forgery" and "fraudulent" for purposes of UCC section 5-114(2) beyond the common law Sztejn fraud exception.
The meaning "fraud in the transaction" in section 5-114(2) is
also troublesome. If the term refers to fraud in documentary
transactions,8 then it is arguably redundant because that definition merely restates the "forged" and "fraudulent" terms.8 5 If,
18
however, the term refers to fraud in the underlying transaction,
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. U.C.M., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1048-49.
182. See Note, supra note 177, at 498-500 and the cases cited therein.
183. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, 1048.
184. This interpretation is consistent with the "narrow definition" referred
to in Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L.J. 596,
602 (1978).
185. See Note, supra note 177, at 502.
186. White and Summers support this expansive reading of fraud:
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then it is undeniably a statutory abrogation of the fundamental
doctrine of separation, 18 7 and could open a Pandora's box of uncertainty concerning the continued viability of that doctrine in
letter of credit transactions.'8 8 Both Sztejn and Intraworld Industries, Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank'18 9 support the abrogation of
the fundamental doctrine of separation, and justify a finding of
"fraud in the transaction," or in the underlying transaction, if the
deliberate acts of a seller have caused the complete failure of performance in the underlying contract. 190
Section 5-114(2)(b), Official Comment 2, provides that the issuing bank may voluntarily dishonor a letter of credit.' 9 ' If the issuIn NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. [14 UCC
1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)] ... [t]he beneficiary argued that the fraud
must be "intrinsic to the documents" and not merely "as to the sales contract." The judge said this distinction is specious, and we agree (although
in our earlier edition we suggested the contrary might be the law). The
facts of this case illustrate a type of "fraud in the transaction"

. . .

inde-

pendent of forgery or fraud in the documents (footnote in brackets).
White & Summers, supra note 108, at 737 (emphasis added).
187. The doctrine of separation is also referred to as the doctrine of "abstraction." See B. KOZOLCHYK, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at 71.
188. The formulation of "fraud in the transaction" of section 5-114 that defines "transaction" as "so intimately related" to the independent letter of credit
contract as to be an implied term of that contract," in Harfield, EnjoiningLetter of Credit Transactions,95 BANKING L.J. 596, 606 (1978) (emphasis added) is
particularly transparent. The factual contexts of individual letter of credit disputes can still blur such distinctions. See Note, supra note 177, at 505.
189. 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975).
190. Such findings must be limited to fact situations that are amenable to
such stark, concrete determinations. "When the beneficiary has intentionally
shipped no goods at all ... the predicate of the independence of the issuer's
engagement [is] removed." Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa.
343, 360, 336 A.2d 316, 325 (1975) (emphasis added). "Yet, the distinction between some goods and none is unavoidably subjective." Id.
191. Professor Schmitthoff has advocated empowering the issuing or confirming bank to voluntarily dishonor the credit through a new provision to be
included in the next revision of the UCP. See supra note 165. Another commentator has made the inverse, antithetical proposal of "[e]liminating the issuer's
right of elective dishonor in cases in which the customer alleges fraud. .

. ."

See

Note, supra note 177, at 510 (emphasis added). The elimination of the voluntary
dishonor "would tend to increase commercial utility of letters of credit." Id.
Professor Schmitthoff bases his proposition on the establishment of fraud by
the buyer whereas the Note only requires the buyer to make an allegation of
fraud. Even though an issuing or confirming bank will require substantive guidance when the information is received, both propositions presumably are based
on the bank's independent judgment.
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ing bank voluntarily dishonors a draft, the seller is forced into
court to bring suit against the bank and bears the burden of
proof. Requiring the seller to prove lack of fraud is fair because
the seller typically has the best access to the facts at issue. Three
factors argue against allowing the bank to exercise voluntary dishonor. First, as a practical matter, the provision for voluntary dishonor appears to permit the bank or the buyer to circumvent the
formidable hurdles involved in obtaining a court injunction restraining payment.192 Second, the power of voluntary dishonor
carries a risk of abuse. 193 Although a buyer may have agreed to
indemnify the bank in the event that a court finds the bank's voluntary dishonor to be wrongful, in the meantime, the bank's voluntary dishonor could have destroyed the seller's security of payment.194 The third and most persuasive argument against
voluntary dishonor is that banks ordinarily do not have sufficient
resources to properly evaluate the factual assertions made by
bank customers. 195 Banks simply cannot be expected to perform
the role of a court by evaluating all the available facts in accordance with the rules of evidence, and properly determine which
party is legally right.96
Because the UCC does not explicitly limit the instances in
which dishonors are justified to those situations in which the
seller has committed the fraud, the UCC fraud exception appears
to be broader than the Sztejn fraud exception. The UCC may be
interpreted as justifying voluntary dishonor when there has been
objective fraud in the transaction,117 even in the absence of the
seller's involvement. Of course, the UCC grants the issuer the
choice of honoring or dishonoring the credit, 9 " regardless of
whether another party is attempting to invoke the fraud exception. The only restrictions on the issuer are the UCC's good faith
192. See Harfield, EnjoiningLetter of Credit Transactions, 95 BANKING L. J.
596, 612-14 (1978). Some commentators have criticized the issuing or confirming
bank's ability to circumvent the court injunction procedure and voluntarily dishonor a credit under UCC 5-114(2)(b). See Note, supra note 177, at 510, 513.
193. See Note, supra note 177, at 510, 513. It is the author's opinion that
this type of abuse should be proved empirically before an attempt is made to
eliminate banks' power to voluntarily dishonor.

194. Id.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 513.
See id.
See supra note 186.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
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requirement, and the possibility of an injunction enjoining the
honor. 19 9 The wide latitude granted to banks is reasonable because the good faith requirement obviates the need for a bank to
determine the facts 20 0 and then assume the risk for that
determination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Sztejn principles present to issuing banks a perplexing dilemma in international letter of credit transactions. Issuing banks
that have received notice of fraud in the underlying transaction
may yet be presented with documents that apparently conform to
the letter of credit requirements by a seller who is not a holder in
due course. If the bank refuses payment and a court determines
that the fraud was not sufficiently egregious, the bank will be liable for breach of contract between the bank and the seller. But if
the bank relies on the doctrine of separation and pays the draft,
and a court later determines that the fraud was egregious, the
bank could be faced with liability to the buyer and a virtually
worthless right of recovery 20 1 from the fraudulent seller. Under
Sztejn, therefore, a bank may be forced to investigate any allegations of fraud in order to avoid liability arising from a breach of
contract. To require issuing banks to conduct an investigation of
all allegations of fraud in letter of credit transactions will place an
undue burden on banks that will probably hamper international
trade by increasing the cost of credit. The potential risk is that
every allegation of fraud could either delay payment because of
the investigation demands or lead to litigation that may significantly diminish a seller's certainty of payment. As a consequence,
a very important consideration in international letter of credit
transactions would be the real possibility of being forced to litigate in a foreign arena.
The primary advantage of the Sztejn approach, protection of
the buyer against fraud in the transaction, is also provided by the
UCC approach. In addition, the UCC provides enhanced and specific protection for those banks in the domestic setting.20 2 Under
the UCC, the issuing bank still risks breaching the letter of credit
contract with the seller if a court finds that its refusal to pay on
199. Id.
200. See Note, supra note 177, at 513.
201. See Edward Owen Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 764, 771-72.
202.

See UCC § 5-114(3).
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the draft was based on less than egregious fraud.0 An issuing
bank acting in good faith, however, may always play it safe and
honor the draft despite any allegations of fraud. In short, the
UCC approach reduces the risk to issuing banks and the need to
investigate allegations of fraud in domestic transactions as well as
reducing the risk and investigation required under the Sztejn approach in the international arena. Although the seller's certainty
of payment is also reduced under the UCC approach, certainty of
payment is not as potent a deterrent to domestic trade as it is in
international transactions. Both the UCC approach and the
Sztejn fraud exception contain a value judgment that the enhanced protection of the buyer against fraud commensurately offsets the directly proportional atrophy of the seller's security of
payment.
In contrast, the unqualified liability approach of the UCP
forces the buyer to assume the risk of fraud (in the absence of
protective provisions in the letter of credit), ensures the sellers'
certainty of payment, and simplifies and reduces the cost of
credit to the banks. The UCP approach to risk-allocation encourages international trade more than any other approach and, thus,
may be preferable in international transactions. Because domestic
trade does not present the seller with the risk of litigating disputes in a foreign forum, the domestic buyer is afforded greater
protection than its international counterpart without discouraging the seller or placing an undue burden on the banks. The UCC
approach, by contrast, affords greater protection to the buyer,
and seems to present the best approach for regulating domestic
transactions. Whether the UCC approach should be utilized in international trade depends upon an analysis of the empirical deterrent effect that the UCC provisions would have on international trade. If, under the UCC, a bank is in good faith able to
honor a draft that is presented with conforming documents, even
after notification of fraud in the transaction, the deterrent effect
on international trade may be insignificant. Furthermore, the
UCC approach would not place too onerous a burden on banks
unless acting in good faith was interpreted to require the bank to
investigate allegations of fraud. Requiring the bank to investigate
203. The bank, however, should be able either to indemnify the buyer if it
acted on its own initiative and committed an error of judgment or to sue successfully on an indemnity from the buyer if the bank acted in breach pursuant
to instructions from the buyer.
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allegations of fraud, or determining that the UCC had a significantly detrimental effect on international trade, would justify embracing Sztejn as neither imposing too large a cost for protecting
the buyer, nor subjecting banks to the dilemma of deciding
whether to honor drafts, when the banks are aware of fraud in the
underlying transactions.

